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NOTE AND COMMENT
INDUCING BRSA.CH oF AGRE£MSNT BY EMPLOYSS No-r ro JoxN A LABOR
UmoN, IN 0RDr:R ro CoMPSL UNIONIZATION oF PLAINTIFF'S BusINSss.-In
Hitchman Coal & Coke Company v. John Mitchell, et al., (Dec. 10, 1917), 38
Sup. Ct. 65, the novel question was presented to the Supreme Court of the United States, as to whether or not members of a labor Union could be enjoined
from conspiring to persuade, and persuading, without violence or show of
violence, plaintiff's employees, not members of the Union,-and who were
working for plaintiff not for a specified time, but under an agreement not to
continue in plaintiff's employment if they joined the Union, this agreement
being fully known to defendants,-secretly to agree to join the Union and
continue working for plaintiff until enough had agreed to join, so that a strike
could be called, and plaintiff be thereby forced to unionize its business of
mining coal.
The majority of the court held that a permanent injunction should issue,
Mr. Justice PxT~Y, delivering the opinion, Mr. Justice BRANDSIS, delivering
a dissenting opinion, in which Mr. Justice HOLMIOS, and Mr. Justice CLARKS,
concurred.

NOTE AND COMMENT
In 1907, plaintiff was the owner of 5000 acres of coal land in ·west Virginia, and employed 200 or 300 men in mining about 300,000 tons of coal
annually. At that time all the mines in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, were
operated as 'union-closed-shop' mines, i. e., no one could hold a job about
them without being a member of the United Mine Workers of America. All·
the mines in West Virginia, except a very few, were 'non-union-open-shop'
mines, while those in Pennsylvania were partly 'open,' and partly 'closedr
mines.
Plaintiff had opened their West Virginia mines in 1!)0;2, and operated them
as "non-union," until April 1903, when, "under threats from the Union
officials," that another mine owned by plaintiff in Ohio, already unionized,
would be closed .down by a strike "if the men at the West Virginia mine
were not allowed to organize," they consented to the unionization of the latter.
For the next three years strikes followed because of difficulties with the
plaintiffs as to scales of wages, and also between the Union and plaintiff's
competitors, for which plaintiff was in no way responsible. The result was
that the mining business in West Virginia was greatly disorganized during
this period, to the loss both of the plaintiff, and the workmen, and plaintiff'smines stood idle from April to June, 1906.
In June, 1906, a self-appointed committee of the former employees of
plaintiff, came to plaintiff to inquire upon what terms they could return towork, and were informed they could come back but not as members of the
United Mine Workers of America; that plaintiff would not recognize that
Union; that contracts would be made with individual workmen only; that
the mines would be run non-union; that if any one wanted to join the union
he could do so, but if he did, he could not remain in the employ of the
company; that if he worked for plaintiff, he would have to work as a nonunion man. Each employee was told this, and agreed to it before he was employed. The employment was not for a specified time. Operations were
resumed, upon these conditions, June 12, 1906, and carried on with entire
satisfaction to all parties for more than a year.
About July 1, 1907, three of the defendants, G., Z., and W., called on
plaintiff's general manager to submit "a proposition for the unionization of
the mine;" the manager refused to consider this, but at the request of these
defendants laid it before plaintiff's board of directors, who rejected it. At
some of the interviews plaintiff's manager told these defendants the terms
upon which the men were employed.
In September, 1907, another defendant, H., was sent by the Union to organize all the mines in the district where plaintiff's mines were located~
H. had distinct and timely notice that the contract between plaintiff and its
employees expressly provided that the latter, if they joined the Union, should
not remain in plaintiff's employment.
H. remained more than a month in the vicinity, interviewing as many of
plaintiff's employees as possible, resorting to deception and abuse, holding
public meetings, at which he abused plaintiff's superintendent, and intimating that wages paid by plaintiff would probably be reduced unless the mines
were unionized. He kept secret the names of those who had agreed to join
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the Union, but said that "after he got the majority he would organize the
place," and that "they had sixty men signed up," about enough to "crack off.,"
and "were going to shut down the mine as soon as he got a few more."
At another non-union mine in the same vicinity, not belonging to plaintiff., the same defendant, H., had been laboring with the employees, and
about the middle of October, had succeeded in shutting it down.
October 24, 1907, plaintiff. brought its bill for an injunction against the
defendants alleging that they have unlawfully formed themselves into a r.onspiracy the purpose of which is "to cause your orator's mine to be shut down,
its plant to remain idle, its contracts to be broken and unfulfilled, until your
-0rator shall submit to the demand of the Union" to unionize its plant, and
thereafter to employ only Union men.
·
A final decree granting a perpetual injunction was made in 1913 by the
District Court, (202 Fed. 512); this was reversed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1914 (214 Fed. 685) ; afterwards an appeal was allowed, but
dismissed by the Supreme Court, although a writ of certiorari was granted
(241 U. S. 644). Upon final hearing the decree of the Circuit Court of
Appeals was reversed, and the decree of the District Court modified, and
affirmed as modified.
Mr. Justice PITNsy's opinion is based upon propositions which may be
-summarized:
As to plaintiff's rights: (I) Plaintiff is as free to make non-membership
in a union a condition of employment, as the working man is free to join the
union. This is part of the constitutional right of personal liberty and private
property, not to be taken away even by legislation, except under the para::mount police power. (2) Plaintiff. is entitled to be protected in the status
created by the agreement,-even if it was terminable at the will of either
party, for that does not make it at the will of others, and by the weight of
authority the unjustified interference of third parties is actionable although
the employment is at will.
(3) Plaintiff is entitled to the continued good will of its employees, and
the value of the relation is in the reasonable probability that by treating its
employees fairly it will be able to retain them, and to secure others as needed.
(4) The right of action for persuading an employee to leave his employer
is universally recognized, and rests upon fundamental principles of general
application, and not upon the English Statute of Laborers.
As to defendants' juslificati-On: (1) No question of the rights of employees is involved. Even if they have a right to strike, defendants have no
-right to instigate a strike, since they are not the agents of the employees.
(2) While defendants and other workmen have a right to form unions,
and invite other workingmen to join, generally, the right is not absolute, but
must be exercised with a reasonable regard to the conflicting rights of others.
That a defendant wants the services is not a justification for enticing an
employee.
(3) Defendants' efforts were not bona fide to enlarge the membership of
the Union, but to organize the mine as a means to compel the owners to change
their method of operation.
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(4) The means employed by defendants were unlawful, even though peaceable, since it was a combination to procure concerted breaches of lmown
contracts, intentionally and maliciously designed to inflict unnecessary damage on plaintiff by a strike, making it difficult if not impossible for plaintiff
to run its mine non-union, as it had a right to do.
(5) This is not a case of defendants withholding fro01 an employer an
economic need,-a supply of labor,-until he assents to be governed by the
Union regulations, for defendants have no supply of labor, needed by plaintiff,
for the supply of non-union labor was ample in the district.
(6) Defendants are not justified by competition, for they are not competitors of the plaintiff, and if they were, their method would be unfair, and
subject to injunction, just as it would be for a competing trader to induce
his rival's clerks to desert him at a critical time in order to cripple his
business.
The District Court held the United Mine Workers of America and its
branches, an unlawful organization under the laws of West Virginia and
under the Federal Anti-Trust Act; also that the injunction should apply to
three defendants not served with summons, and to the officers, not parties to
the suit, but who had succeeded in office some of the original defendants, and
also all present and future members of the Union without naming them.
These were held to be erroneous.
The most important parts of Mr. Justice BRAND£IS' dissenting opinion
relate to (x) Unionizing plaintiff's mine; (2) Attempt to induce employees to
violate their contracts; and (3) Persuading employees to leave plaintiff's
employment.
As to (1) a distinction, based upon the testimony is drawn between
"unionizing the mine," and "unionizing the employees ;" the latter is only
inducing the employees to join the Union; the former- is inducing the employer to enter into a collective agreement with the Union (a) to employ only
members of the Union; (b) to negotiate only with its officers as to wages,
hours, etc.; (c) to treat only with the Union's representatives in settling
disputes arising from the employment.
Each of these is legal. To obtain them, any or all, men may strive or
strike; and if a Union may strike to obtain them, why not to secure an
agreement to provide for them? There is no coercion in the legal sense,
where a Union merely endeavors to induce employees to join a Union, with
the intention thereafter to order a strike, unless the employer consents to
unionize his shop. He is free to accept the agreement or disadvantage as he
chooses. If it is coercion to threaten to strike unless plaintiff consents to a
closed union-shop, it is also coercion to threaten not to give employment
unless the applicant will consent to a closed non-union shop. Either has the
equal right to withhold such an economic need from the other; in a legal
sense an agreement entered into, under such circumstances, is voluntarily
entered into.
As to (2), there is evidence of an attempt to induce plaintiff's employees
to agree to join the Union; but none whatever of any attempt to induce them
to violate their contract. Until an employee actually joined the Union, he
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was not, under the contract, called upon to leave plaintiff's employ; there was
no breach of contract until he both joined and failed to withdraw. If it was
intended to secure agreements to join when a large number had consented
to do so, and then join together, and strike, unless plaintiff consented to
unionize his mine,-this would clearly be permissible under the contract.
As to (3), to induce third persons to leave an employment, or not to
-enter it, if done maliciously and without justifiable cause is actionable although such persons are free to exercise their own will. The contract here
added nothing to plaintiff's right in this connection, since it was terminable
at will. Persuasion, merely as a means is lawful, if, and only if, for a
justifiable cause; here this was to strengthen the Union, and the individual's
bargaining power by collective bargaining, so the workmen's condition would
be improved. It should not be doubted that to induce workmen to leave or
not to.enter employment to advance such purpose, is justifiable when they are
·not bound by contract to remain in such employment.
At the same time a decision was rendered in Eagle Glass & Manufactur.ing Co. v. Thomas W. Rowe, et al., 38 Sup. Ct. So, involving the same situation, Mr. Justice PI'l'N:£Y pronouncing the opinion of the majority of the
Court, and the same justices dissenting as in the Hitchman case. In this
Glass case, the Circuit Court of Appeals, had said : "There is nothing in the
contract which requires such employees to work for any fixed or definite
period. If any of them should decide to join [the Union] the plaintiff could
not recover damages for the breach of the same. * * * The only penalty is
that they cannot secure further employment from the plaintiff. * * * Such
being the case it would be unreasonable to hold the Union liable in damages
to the plaintiff because they had used lawful methods to induce the nonunion miners to become members of their organization. We fail to see how
-this contract can be taken as a basis for restraining the defendants from using
lawful methods for inducing the parties to the contract to join the organization."
Mr. Justice P1tN:£Y says: "This reasoning, essential to the decision reach·ed, is erroneous for several reasons: (stated in the Hitchman case) (a) be-cause plaintiff was entitled by law to be protected from interference with the
good will of its employees, although they were at liberty to quit the employment at pleasure; (b) because the case involved no question of the rights
·of employers, and their right to quit gave to defendants no right .to instigate
a strike; and (c) because the methods pursued by the defendants were not
lawful methods." These are substantially the same as (3) above, under
Plaintiff's rights, and (1) and (4) under Defendant's justification.
It is only in (4) above, that "procuring concerted breaches of known contracts," is relied on as ·one of the elements of unlawfulness. Mr. Justice
BRAND:£IS, (2) above, says there is no evidence "whatever of any attempt to
-induce them to violate their contracts."
The majority opinion seems to consider that "agreeing to join" the Union,
and still continuing to work for the plaintiff, until the employee should
actually be taken into the Union, and becoming thereby subject to its juris-Oiction, was a substantial breach of the contract of employment, and if this

NOTE AND COMMENT

255

was induced by the defendant with lmowledge, it was unlawful. Mr.
Justice BRANDJUS on the other hand held that only by continuing to work for
the plaintiff after the employee had actually been taken into the Union would
be a breach of the contract. He seemed to admit that inducing the employer
to do that would be technically unlawful, but does not state very clearly that
such would be the case, or that it would be important if it were the case. In
short "procuring a breach of contract" does not seem to have had much to
do with either the majority or the minority opinion.
Suppose the first day H undertook to unionize plaintiff's mi~e, he had
induced all the employees to join the Union,-it would then have been their
duty, under the contract, to quit working for plaintiff at once,-and the
result would be as disastrous as if they had wrongfully struck,-but plaintiff
certainly could not then have successfully complained, for that reason. On
the other hand, if they had not quit, or if H had induced them not to quit
as the contract called for, could the plaintiff sue them or H, or the Union for
damage for breach of contract, or inducing breach thereof in not quitting?
.Perhaps, yes,-but certainly only for nominal damages; its remedy against
employees would be discharge, and if it discharged one, and the others then
quit, would it have an action against them? Certainly not.
The case would seem to stand then just as it would if there was no
breach of contract,-and then, as conceded in both opinions, inducing plaintiffs
to join the Union or 'going on a strike,' is actionable only if the means used
or the purpose is otherwise unlawful. The majority opinion seems to go the
whole· length of holding that lmowingly to persuade employees to join (or
agree to join) the Union, with the purpose of thereafter being able to order
them to strike, if the Union so determines, is an unlawful purpose and can
be enjoined,-because it disturbs or tends to disturb the status quo, or the
'reasonable probability' that it will remain the same. This certainly goes a
long way in curtailing the right and liberty of one person, or a group of per·
.sons, to persuade one another to enter into co-operation for their supposed
mutual and otherwise lawful benefit.
Suppose that when G, L & W, asked plaintiff to unionize its mine, it had
agreed to do so; this would have been the same sort of a breach of the contract by it, as the agreement to join the Union was by the employees in the
case. Would the employees then have had an injunction against the plaintiff
to prevent it from unionizing its mine, and discharging its employees, or
being able thereafter to do so, if they did not join the Union, contrary to the
agreement? We submit that to be consistent, the Court would have to hold
so. For do not the employees have a right to the same status quo, or to a
'reasonable probability' that their employer will not, at the instance of some
one else, unionize its mine, when it believes it would advance its interests to
do so? It is doubtful if the court would so hold. And if it did, would not
an employer complain that the court had seriously curtailed its constitutional
rights of liberty and property by compelling it to operate its mines 'non-union'
when it wanted to have them 'union.'
Are not the employees and the employers entitled to the 'equal protection',
of the laws by an equal application thereof? They should be.
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In recent years it seems to be conceded that the "right of association for
collective bargaining", should be recognized and protected by the laws in a
way similar to the protection extended to that 'exclusive right' included in the
ownership and control of property; in fact that in no other practical way can
those who have no property secure substantial economic equality with those
who have property. If this is true should not the man's property in himself
and the good will of his associates, be legally protected in the same way and
to the same extent as the ownership of tangible property is?
H. L. W.
WHO IS AN Al.mN Em:uv?-One Gustav Muller, a native German, resided
in England on May 2oth, 1915. He had never been naturalized. He owned a
leasehold house in England, and on the date just mentioned he executed a
power of attorney to one John White to sell this leasehold house and make
proper conveyance of the same. Six days later he was permitted by the British Govemrp.ent to return to Germany, and he started the same day, May
26th. He was known to be in Germany on June nth, but the date of his
arrival was unknown. On June 2 the leasehold was sold to Tingley, but the
latter, upon learning the facts here given respecting Muller refused to proceed
with the contract of sale, and commenced an action for a declaration that
the contract was illegal because at the time it was made the defendant,
Muller, was an alien enemy. Evs, J., held that this fact had not been proved,
and dismissed the action, and an appeal w~ taken to the Court of Appeal,
Tingley v. Muller, [1917] L. R. 2 Ch. 144, and the decision of Evs, J., was
sustained. '
The case raises the broad question of who is an alien enemy, and six
judges of the Court of Appeal wrote extensive opinions upon it. All the
judges agreed that Muller's German nationality and allegiance did not make
him an alien enemy. Five of them agreed that his departure from England
for the purpose of returning to Germany did not make him an alien enemy,
and that he should actually have reached Germany before the character of
alien enemy attached to him. They differed as to the proof necessary to show
his return. Evs, J., had held that evidence of his departure for Germany on
May 26th did not prove his arrival in Germany by June 2, and two judges of
the Court of Appeal, agreed. But the other three judges who thought such
arrival was necessary to be shown, were of opinion that there was a presumption of fact that he arrived within seven days after leaving England.
SCRUTTON, L. J., thought that Muller became an alien enemy the moment
he departed for Germany, on the ground that he thereupon lost his commercial or trade domicil in England and until he acquired another his
national character reverted and this made him an alien enemy.
The t~rm "alien enemy" is used with different meanings, depending on the
principles or rules sought to be applied to the class so designated. Thus
by United States Revised Statutes, Sec. 4067, retating to war, it is enacted
that "all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or
government, being males of the age of fourteen years and upward, shall be
liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed, as alien enemies."
This meaning is used in the Presidential Proclamations of April 6 and
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November 16, 1917, regarding the conduct of alien enemies, within the
United States. And it is the meaning employed in such cases as Dorsey v.
Brigham, (1898) 177 Ill. 250, construing statues relating to naturalization.
But in connection with the regulations of trade with the enemy an entirely different meaning is given to the term. It was this meaning which was
involved in Tingley v. Muller. The British Trading With the Enemy Act,
1914, (4-5 Geo. 5, ch. 87), does not define the term, but the Trading with the
Enemy Proclamation, No. 2, of September 9, 1914, defined an "enemy'' as
any person of whatever nationality resident or carrying on business in the
enemy country (Tingley v. Muller, p. 179, per SCRU'.ffl>N, L. J.). This is
substantially the same definition as that given by our own Trading With the
Enemy Act, of Oct. 6, 1917, which defines an enemy as a person residing in
enemy territory or resident outside of the United States and doing business
within enemy territory.
The term as employed in these acts has clearly taken on a meaning relevant to the purpose with which the acts were passed, namely, trade or commerce. Nationality has nothing to do with the matter, and domicil is not
controlling. A German citizen residing in the United States, though domiciled in Germany, is not an alien enemy, while a neutral domiciled in a
neutral country may be an alien enemy, if he is engaged in business within
enemy territory. Even a citizen of the United States would be an alien
enemy if voluntarily resident in a hostile country. D1~Y ON PARTI£S, p. J.
It is when one becomes a part of the business organization of the enemy,
directly contributing by his trade or business to the welfare of the enemy,
that he becomes an alien enemy under these Acts. The common law, which
forbad trading with the enemy, as well as statutes regulating the matter, are
"governed upon the public policy, which forbids the doing of acts that will
be or may be to the advantage of the enemy State by increasing its capacity
for prolonging hostilities in adding to the credit, money or goods, or other
resources available to individuals in the enemy State. Trading with a British subject or the subject of a neutral state carrying on business in the hostile
territory is as much assistance to the alien enemy as if it were with a subject of enemy nationality carrying on business in the enemy State, and, therefore, for the purpose of the enforcement of civil rights, they are equally
treated as alien enemies." Per Lord ~DING, in Parler v. Freudenberg [1915]
l K. B. 866.
This is analogous to the view taken by the prize courts as to "enemy
property." Thus in The Benito Estenger (1899), 176 U. S. 568, 571, the
Supreme Court said that "property engaged in any illegal intercourse with
the ·enemy is deemed enemy property, whether belonging to an ally or a
citizen, as the illegal traffic stamps it with the hostile character."
In the Millier Case there was nothing to show that the defendant had
begun to carry on trade in Germany from any point outside of Germany,
so that the establishment of commercial relations between him and the
enemy could arise only through his re-establishment of residence in Germany. Hence not until he actually reached Germany could he be of any
advantage to the enemy in the way of trade, and the views of the ma-
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jority of the judges was in harmony with this commercial test of enemy
character.
In Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co. [I9I6], 2 A. C. 307,
the House of Lords was asked to go a step farther along the same line, and
hold an English corporation to be an alien enemy because substantially all
its shares were held by German subjects and its directors were all German
subjects, three-fourths of them re,sident in Germany when war was declared. The Court of Appeal had held that it was not an alien enemy. In
the House of Lords, Lord !Lu.sBURY contended that it was an enemy, the
corporation being substantially a mere partnership with a limited liability, all
the partners presumably residing in enemy territory. He thought that "the
unlawfulness of trading with the enemy could not be excused by the ingenuit:•
of the means adopted." Lord ATKINSON thought an English Company might
well be an alien enemy if in fact it could be shown that its real business activity was in enemy territory, but that the record was silent on that point.
Lord SHAW dissented from b<>th these positions, saying that since no dividends or assets could be paid to enemy shareholders, "and all trading with
these shareholders
being interpelled, there is no principle of law which
would, in my humble opinion, justify the incongruity of dominating or regarding the Company itself as enemy either in character or in fact." Lord
P.ARKJm, with whom concurred Lords.MERSSY and KINNSAR, took the position that enemy character could not be given to the company "merely because enemy shareholders may after the war become entitled to their
proper share of the profits of trading,'' but he thought it might assume
enemy character "if its agents or the persons in de facto control of its affairs, whether authorized or not, are resident in an enemy -country, or,
wherever resident, are adhering to the enemy or taking instructions from
or acting under control of enemies." He refused to admit, however, that
the character of individual shareholders could affect the character of the
Company; and on this point Lord P ARMOOR was in accord.
The problems here suggested are equally relevant to conditions in this
country. Our own TRADING WI'tH 'tHS ENSMY Ar::r, so far as corporations
are concerned, does not include companies incorporated in the United States.
However, the illegality of trailing with the enemy was recognized at common law, and the statute does not abrogate or narrow the common law
principles, but only makes special regulations and provides special penalties
for certain classes of acts of this character. The war has brought up a large
number of cases in England involving both the common law and statutory
rules relating to alien enemies, and in the controversies which are sure to
arise here over trading with the enemy, these English cases are likely to
prove of great practical value to American lawyers.
E. R. S.

**

WHSN IS A PRSFSREN'tIAL TRANsna ''REQUIRSD" 'to Br: Rr:coRDr:n?-The

BANKRUP'.rCY Ar::r of 18g8 (as amended in I903 and 1910), after defining a
preference, provides in § 6ob that preferences made under certain circumstances may be recovered from the preferred creditor if the latter had "rea-
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sonable cause to believe" that a preference was to be effected "at the time of
the transfer * * * or of the recording or registering of the transfer if by
!aw recording or registering thereof is required," such time being within four
months before bankruptcy. Bankrupcty courts have for years been vexed
with the question: When is a transfer "required" to be recorded under this
provision of the Act? Various suggestions as to the meaning of the Act were
made by the various Circuit Courts of Appeals, but the question was finally
authoritatively decided-in part, at least-in 1916 in the case of Carey v.
Donohue, 240 U. S. 430. This case decided that a transfer was not "required" to be recorded under the provisions of § 6o unless the requirement
was (to quote from the opinion in that case) "for the protection of creditor:>,
-the persons interested in the bankrupt estate, and in whose behalf, or in
whose place, the trustee is entitled to act." The decision in Carey v. Donohue
was that an Ohio statute requiring the recording of deeds of land in order
to make them effective as against subsequent bona fide purchasers was not
such a requirement as was meant by § 6o, and, of course, the decision is
authoritative only on that point. The decision has therefore left open the
question whether a statute requiring the recording of a transfer in order to
make it effective as against ans creditor is sufficient to satisfy the provision
of the statute, or whether the recording act must require the record in order
to make the transfer valid as against the particular kind of creditor, who is
in the particular case, represented by the trustee in bankruptcy. The Supreme Court of the United States has just decided, in Martin v. Commercial
National Bank, 38 Sup. Ct. -, that it is the latter requirement that must
be made.
In a comment on Carey v. Donohue (14 M1cn. L. Rmr. 578, 581) it was said
that the language of the court in that case "seems to indicate pretty clearly
that if the local law requires recording as against any of the classes of persons referred to in § 47a (2) there is a 'requirement' under § 6o. Under
§ 47a (2) the trustee is given 'the rights, remedies and powers of a creditor
holding a lien by legal or equitable proceedings' on property in the custody, or
coming into the custody of the bankruptcy court; as to property not in such
custody, he has the 'rights, remedies and powers of a judgment creditor holding an execution duty returned unsatisfied.' The Supreme Court* * * seems
to indicate, without regard to any distinction as to the two classes of property
referred to in §47a (2), that if the local law requires recording as against
any of the classes of creditors referred to in that section, recording is required under § 6o." This interpretation of the decision in Carey v. Donohue
was also made by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
the case of Bunch v. Maloney, 233 Fed. g61, 147 C. C. A. (affirming In re T.
H. Bunch Commission Co., 225 Fed. 243), in which the court had under consideration an Arkansas statute which provided that unrecorded chattel mortgages were void as against subsequent purchasers and lien creditors. Referring to the decision in Carey v. Donohue, the Court said: "Two views
may be taken of the construction given by Carey v. Donohue to the recording
t equirement clause of § 6ob: First, that it is for the benefit of creditors generally, because their rights are the concern of bankruptcy proceedings, but
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does not embrace those cases in which the requirement is in the interest of
persons outside the purview of the BANKRUPTCY A<:!r. Second, that as to the
creditors themselves the clause picks up and adopts all the substantive and
procedural limitations "Of the construction of the statute prescribing the
requirement; and if in local practice creditors of a particular class, like general creditors, could not: invoke the failure to record, a corresponding disability rests upon the trustee in bankruptcy." After discussing the result
sought to be attained by this section of the BANKRUPTCY A<:!r, namely, the
striking down of all secret liens, the court decided that the trustee in bankruptcy might "invoke the remedy of § 6ob regardless of the local construction
of the statute making a procedural distinction between creditors with a lien
and those without." So also in the case of Hawkins v. Dannenberg Co., 234
Fed. 752. Judge LAMBDIN of the District Court for the Second District of
Georgia, though compelled to a contrary decision by the authority of Martin
Y. Commercial National Bank, .228 Fed. 651, 143 C. C. A. 173, stated his opinion
that under the decision in Carey v. Donohue, a provision of the Georgia statute
making unrecorded mortgages void as against lien creditors only was nevertheless a "requirement" of reci>rding under § 6o of the BANKRUPTCY A<:!r.
This is the same Georgia statute that was under consideration by the Supreme Court in the principal case.
To the contrary, however, are the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Martin v. Bank, supra (affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United State!; in the principal case) and the case of
Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co. v. 'Lawson, 237 Fed. 877, decided by
the District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, in a case raised under
the Iowa act providing for a recording of conditional sale contracts, and
holding that the trustee in bankruptcy acquired no rights as against previously recorded conditional sale contract because the latter was "required"
to be recorded only as against lien creditors.
The question seems now to be finally settled in such a manner as to leave
little room for doubt, but-it is unfortunate that the Act has been so framed as
to make possible the result which has now finally been attained. As is said·
by the court in Bunch v. Maloney, s"pra, in arguing against the construction
now adopted by the Supreme Court, "It is difficult to perceive much result of
consequence in the amendment of l9IO of § 6ob. Though twice amended for
further effectiveness, it would be doubtful that the section, so. construed,
would accomplish anything of practical value." And the cogency of this
argument seems obvious. It is not the lien creditor that requires protection,
but the general creditor, and it is to be regretted that the Supreme Court,
in choosing between two possible courses open to it, has again, as in Carey,
v. Donohue, taken the path that gives least power to the trustee in bank-·
ruptcy, and most protection to the preferred creditor.
E. H.

JoY-RIDING, SIMPI.S AND CoMPOUND.-The wrongful use of another's automobile, even though accompanied by a trespassory taking, cannot, if followed
by a return to the owner or an abandonment, be easily brought within the
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definition of larceny at common law or under the ordinary larceny statutes,
because of the requirement of intent to deprive the owner permanently oi
his property. Smith v. State, 146 S. W. 547; State v. Boggs (Iowa, 1917),
164 N. W. 759; McCLAIN, Ctm.!:INAL LAW, §566. Of course, such intent, at
the time of taking, might be found in spite of return or abandonment,
though it is doubtful whether the bare circumstances stated above would
constitute sufficient evidence of that intent to go to the jury. Rex v. Phillips,
2 East P. C. 662; Brennon v. Com., 16g Ky. 815; State v. Slingerland, 19 Nev.
135; State v. Davis, 38 N. J. L. 176; People v. Flynn, 7 Utah 378. As a matter
of law, intent to abandon at a distance, as distinguished from intent to return, has been held to be sufficient, on the principle that reckless indifference
to harmful consequences is equivalent, in law as well as in ethics, to a direct
purpose to produce such consequences. State v. Davis, supra. See also the
other cases last above cited. Reg. v. Prince, 13 Cox C. C. 138, and People v.
Cummings, 123 Cal. 26g. And, if this position be granted, such abandonment
after a trespassory taking would make a case of larceny, on the theory of
continuing trespass, even though, at the time of taking, the intent had been
to return the property. Reg. v. Riley, 6 Cox C. C. 88; Weaver v. State, 77
Ala. z6; Com. v. Wliite, I I Cush. 483; State v. Coombs, 55 Me. 477. Again,
in any of these cases, a charge of larceny of the gasoline consumed might
he sustained. By hypothesis, this gasoline has been taken by trespass and
carried away, mixed perhaps with more not consumed, and its consumption
sufficiently evidences an intent to deprive the owner thereof. A defense
based on the theory that defendant never thought of the gasoline might be
difficult to dispose of as a matter of law, but could hardly succeed on the
issue of fact to the jury. A difficulty arises here as to the description of
the property, but an indictment descn"bing it as "gasoline in a quantity to
the grand jurors unknown, of the value of twenty cents per gallon" would
be sufficient BISHOP CRIM. PRo., § 553. If a specific quantity were laid in the
indictment, a variance in the proof would not, at least under the more h"beral authorities, be fatal. State v. Kreps, 8 Ala. 951; Com. v. Griffin, 21 Pick.
523; Hagerman v. State, 54 N. J. L. 104 (semble); State v. Martin, 82 N. C.
ft;2. These problems may be further complicated by the circumstances of
the taking. If possession of the car was obtained by fraud, the taking could"
still be made out under the doctrine of larceny by trick. McCr.Am CRm.
LAW, §§ 559, 56o. If the owner of the car had delivered possession to defendant as his servant, and he had abused the trust, the taking could be
made out under the doctrine that in such a case the delivery vests a mere
custody. lb. § 556. If, on the other hand, the defendant was a bailee of
the car, no larceny could be established. As to whether embezzlement could
be made out, that would depend, of course, upon the phraseology of the
statutes, but it is doubtful whether the broadest of the embezzlement statutes
would ~e held to cover the case, the difficulty turning chiefly upon the construction of the words "fraudulently" and "convert." McCr.AIN, §§ 640, 641;
87 Am. St. Rep. 19, note.
The foregoing theories are fairly comprehensive, yet, as they involve
difficulties of proof as well as some propositions of law which might not be
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accepted by a conservative court, there is ample justification for legislation
dealing specifically with this sort of wrongdoing. Whether the current legislation can pass the ordeal of judicial construction, is not so clear. An Iowa
statute provided that, "if any chauffeur or other person shall without the consent of the owner take, or cause to be taken, any automobile or motor vehicle,
and operate or drive or cause the same to be operated or driven, he shall be
imprisoned,'' etc. 1913 SUPP. TO Com:, § 4823. In the case of State v. Boggs
(Oct. 20, 1917), 164 N. W. 759, which was a prosecution under this statute,
defendant having obtained prosecutor's permission to use his automobile for
15 or 20 minutes, had driven it to a city eighty miles distant, where it was
disabled and left in a garage. The state excepted to the refusal of the trial
court to instruct that, "consent given by the owner of the car for a specific
purpose or for a stated time, would not be consent to use the car for a
different purpose, nor generally, nor for an unlimited time." The Supreme
Court overruled the exception and volunteered the statement that, "The
statute was not designed to punish one who obtains consent of the owner to
take and operate his motor vehicle by misrepresentation or for a fraudulent
r,urpose."
The future course of development can readily be forecast. A· statute will
be enacted covering the case of abuse of consent by excessive user, and another covering the case of consent procured by fraud. We shall then have
a tripartite division of the offense of joy-riding, analogous to the division of
larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses. A few more statutes defining
aggravated or compound joy-riding will complete the legal edifice, and further
demonstrate the adaptability of the law to changing conditions. E. N. D.

